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Abstract
I explore a challenge that idealisations pose to scientific realism and
argue that the realist can best accommodate idealisations by capital-
ising on certain modal features of idealised models that are underwrit-
ten by laws of nature.
1 Introduction
This paper explores a challenge that idealisations pose to scientific realism.
I will review the challenge before briefly assessing some recent analyses of
idealised models that function as a foil and motivation for my response to
the challenge. I will argue that the realist can best accommodate idealisa-
tions by capitalising on certain modal features of idealised models that are
underwritten by laws of nature.
The idea that idealisations in some sense represent possibilia is common
place. Typical idealisations—such as frictionless planes, point masses, isol-
ated systems, and omniscient agents—are naturally thought of in terms of
possible systems that are suitably related to some actual systems of interest.
David Lewis, for example, thought that we can best make sense of the per-
vasive utility of idealisations in science in terms of possible worlds that are
more and less similar to the actual world.
[We find it much easier to tell the truth if we sometimes drag
in the truthlike fiction, and when] we do, we traffic in possible
worlds. Idealisations are unactualised things to which it is useful
to compare actual things. An idealised theory is a theory known
to be false at our world, but true at worlds thought to be close to
ours. The frictionless planes, the ideal gases, the ideally rational
belief systems—one and all, these are things that exist as parts
of other worlds than our own. The scientific utility of talking of
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idealisations is among the theoretical benefits to be found in the
paradise of possibilia. (1986, pp. 26–27)
Recognising that idealisations are naturally thought of in terms of pos-
sibilia is but a start, however. The spadework lies in properly accounting
for the utility of such modal constructs.1 What, then, is required to account
for the utility of idealisations in science? Various questions present them-
selves here. I will focus on the following challenge to scientific realism, in
particular: given that idealisations incorporate false assumptions about the
way the world is, why are idealisations so important for making successful
predictions and for coming up with powerful explanations?
I will examine this challenge in relation to idealised models in particu-
lar. (Often theoretical laws are also characterised as idealised. My focus
is on idealised modelling assumptions other than laws.) This challenge dif-
fers from the standard arguments against scientific realism, deriving from
a ‘pessimistic induction’ over past false theories, or the idea that theories
can be underdetermined by evidence. These stock anti-realist arguments
are typically framed in terms of scientific theories. It is interesting that the
realism debate has been largely framed in terms of theories, even though
in contemporary philosophy of science much of the focus has shifted from
theories to models as the most fitting ‘unit’ of philosophical analysis. In as
far as realism is primarily motivated by the impressive empirical success of
science (culminating in novel predictions), it is typically models that provide
or facilitate such success. Furthermore, according to a popular ‘modelling
view’ of science, theories in a sense are nothing but families of models (uni-
fied by laws).
When we shift the focus from theories to models, anti-realists can find
further ammunition from various kinds of inconsistencies that modelling
practices exhibit. Often different models of one and the same phenomenon
are mutually inconsistent with one another. Some models are even intern-
ally inconsistent. And many models incorporate assumptions that are at
odds—sometimes radically so—with modellers’ background beliefs. Such
inconsistencies can be used to challenge the realist in as far as they indicate
that various kinds of falsehoods are playing a bigger role in the production of
the empirical successes that realists are inclined to think. If falsehoods can
play a significant role in bringing about empirical successes, perhaps the
role played by (approximate) truths is less significant than realists would
have it? Perhaps the joint contribution to empirical success from idealising
falsehoods, and whatever degree of (approximate) truth there is to a model
otherwise, can be so entangled that we can make no sense of the realist credo
that a model’s empirical success is due to its ‘latching onto reality’?
1A lot has been written about modal aspects of idealisations. I will not attempt to relate
my point of view here to the broader context of the Poznań school and the verisimilitude
literature, for example. See Niiniluoto (2007) for a review.
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What follows is concerned with this kind of challenge, arising out of the
indispensability of idealisations for modelling. I will start by fleshing out
the challenge (§2), before briefly reviewing some philosophical analyses of
idealisations (§3), paving the way for my own response to the challenge (§4).
2 Realism and idealisations: a challenge
Let us first try to get a good handle on the ‘idealisation-challenge’ pre-
viewed above. How exactly do idealised models challenge a realist attitude
to science? Sorensen (2012) crisply (if somewhat provocatively) explains:
Scientists wittingly employ false assumptions to explain and predict.
Falsification is counter-productive in the pursuit of truth. So scientific
realism appears to imply that idealisation would be worse than inef-
fective.
The instrumentalist says the scientist merely aims at the prediction
and control of phenomena. [. . . ] Given that scientists are indifferent
to the truth and often believe idealisations will promote prediction and
control, the instrumentalist predicts that the scientists will idealise.
Consequently, idealisation looks like a crucial experiment for philo-
sophy of science. [. . . ] Since scientists idealise, the instrumentalism
prevails. (p. 30)
In other words, if realism is committed to the notion that science aims at
truth, while anti-realists regard lesser aims of empirical and instrumental
adequacy to be enough, then idealisations seem to speak against realism.
One might worry that this challenge to realism quickly evaporates in
the light of obvious realist responses applicable to many (or perhaps even
most) idealisations.2 Consider various ‘Galilean’ idealisations, for example,
that McMullin (1985) views as providing an argument for scientific real-
ism, not against it. Take an idealised model of a gravitational pendulum,
for instance. It incorporates various simplifying assumptions, such as the
complete absence of air resistance, friction, and so on. But it does so in
a way that readily suggests ways in which the model can be de-idealised,
for example by simply adding further terms to the model’s force function.
McMullin rightly points out that a realist reading of idealised models best
predicts and explains models’ capacity to be thus de-idealised; therefore such
idealisations arguably support (a suitably qualified form of) realism about
these kinds of idealised models.3
2To be clear, Sorensen himself notes that idealisations only ‘appear’ to challenge sci-
entific realism, and he does not endorse the instrumentalist conclusion in the offing. I will
review Sorensen’s reasoning in §3.
3See McMullin (1985):
If the original model merely ‘saved the appearances’ without in any way
approximating to the structure of the object whose behavior is under scru-
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In general, a realist perspective on scientific modelling clearly has the
wherewithal to account for the way in which various kinds of simplifications
are pragmatically indispensable in the scientific study of systems of otherwise
unmanageable complexity. Realist reading of theories suggests different ways
of brushing aside complications that, according to our theory, make next to
no contribution to the end result. After all, science is obviously not only
in ‘the pursuit of truth’, even according to the realist; it is also in the
pursuit of achieving actual results, mathematical tractability, predictions,
effective control and manipulability, and so on. The different aspects of
Galilean idealisations are ways in which the realist can anticipate deliberate
‘falsifications’ (typically simplifications) to contribute to the latter pursuits.4
This realist response does not answer the challenge completely, how-
ever, since some idealisations do not fit the Galilean mould. Philosophers of
science have identified other, more radical idealisations in science, and the
question remains whether some of these non-Galilean idealisations rather
support instrumentalism about certain kinds of models. What should a real-
ist say about ‘uncontrollable’ idealisations where no de-idealisation is in the
offing? (See e.g. Batterman, 2005) What about idealisations involved in the
so-called minimal models, such as the Ising-model? How should the realist
accommodate these kinds of idealisations that seem altogether indispens-
able, going beyond the kind of broadly pragmatic convenience associated
with Galilean idealisations? How can the realist account for the indispens-
able utility of such falsifications in modelling? This is one challenge that
remains for the realist.
Moreover, even with respect to Galilean idealisations, there is further
work to be done in clarifying the letter of the realist response. For example,
is there a conceptual framework within which the utility of different types of
idealisations can be accounted for in unified terms? Intuitively speaking, the
realist response to the challenge from idealised models is to say that there
is a sense in which an idealised model ‘latches onto’ reality in a way that is
responsible for the model’s empirical success. One challenge is to articulate
this notion of ‘latching onto reality’ so as to capture the relevant features
of models in a way that meshes with the realist intuitions. Call this the
articulation-of-realism challenge. What does an idealised model ‘get right’
about its target system, such that it is empirically successful by virtue of
getting those things right (and despite getting some other things wrong)?
tiny, there would be no reason why this reversal of a simplifying assumption,
motivated by the belief that the object does possess something like the struc-
ture attributed to it, would work as it does. Taking the model seriously as
an approximately true account is what leads us to expect the correction to
produce a verifiable prediction. The fact that formal idealisation rather con-
sistently does work in this way is a strong argument for a moderate version
of scientific realism. (p. 262)
4McMullin (1985) distinguishes three different types of Galilean idealisations.
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This challenge of articulating how idealised models latch onto reality has
been recognised in the vast literature on idealisations, and realists typically
maintain that there is some principled sense in which predictive (as well as
explanatory) success is due to models latching onto reality. This then under-
writes the realist’s epistemic commitment for regarding predictive success
as a (fallible) indicator of models latching onto reality in this sense.
Philosophers have appealed to different conceptual and formal resources
in spelling out this idea, ranging from accounts of verisimilitude, to partial
structures and quasi-truth, to philosophy of language/logic, to philosophy
of fiction.5 I cannot do full justice to this rich literature here, but I will next
briefly review a couple of recent analyses of idealisation as a foil for my own
perspective. To prefigure: in my view these analyses fall short of properly
accounting for the empirical success of idealised models. Providing a sense
in which a model can get things right, while also getting things wrong,
does not in and of itself account for how the falsehoods are immaterial for
the empirical successes at stake, and how the empirical successes are due
to ‘getting things right’. After discussing these analyses of idealisations
I will take steps towards a different (possibly complementary) account of
idealisations that better serves the realist’s need to explain the empirical
success of idealised models. This requires reflecting more closely on what
it takes to account for predictive success of a model that incorporates false
assumptions. I will argue that such an account can turn on showing how
a model’s predictive success is robust with respect to variation in the false
assumptions involved in idealisations, in the sense that these assumptions
could have been different without undoing the predictive success. I will
argue that it is this modal character of idealisations that can account for
their utility from a realist perspective.
3 Some analyses of idealised models
Idealisations as suppositional. Recall Sorensen’s presentation of the
idealisation-challenge above. His own response to it is iconoclastic. Typ-
ically philosophers characterise idealisation as being essentially a matter of
some sort of intentional introduction of distortion into a scientific model
or theory, with different philosophers holding different views regarding the
nature of such ‘intentional distortions’. For example, such intentional dis-
tortion has been taken to be a matter of indirect assertion of something
true (Strevens); relativized assertion of something true (Giere); temporary
assertion of falsehood (McMullin); or assertion in the mood of pretence
(Toon, Frigg, and various others). In contrast to these different ways of
regarding idealisation as some sort of attenuated assertion, Sorensen views
idealisations as suppositional, in analogy to suppositional premises in a con-
5See e.g. Niiniluoto (2007), da Costa and French (2003), Sorensen (2012), Toon (2012).
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ditional proof.6 That is, Sorensen’s perspective on idealisation—drawing
on philosophy of language and logic—regards it as a matter of ‘simplifying
supposition,’ naturally free of any realist commitment. (Compare: a math-
ematician’s supposition that ‘there is a largest prime’ for the purpose of
reductio ad absurdum entails no commitment to finitude of primes.) In sum:
Idealisation is constituted by supposition. Only simplified suppositions
count as idealisations. The filters are psychological and methodolo-
gical. Idealisers seek tractability, memorability, and transmissibility
(rather like myth makers). (Sorensen 2012, p. 37)
Sorensen contends that we can thus assimilate idealisations with some-
thing that is already well understood by logicians—a supposition that initi-
ates a conditional proof or reductio ad absurdum. Allegedly we thus have an
‘off-the-shelf’ model for analysing idealisations as a matter of propositions
that are governed by well-understood rules of rational use; not ontologically
committing, for well-understood reasons; and not in need of elimination.
And all this arguably explains, at least in part, why scientists are so happy
to idealise, and are not overly preoccupied with de-idealisation or the ‘dis-
tance’ of verisimilitude between idealisation and the exact truth.
While Sorensen’s perspective may throw light on some idealisations in
science, for various reasons I do not find the analogy convincing or illu-
minating in general. Even the simplest paradigmatic exemplars of Galilean
idealisation, such as the ideal pendulum or a frictionless plane, seem to
be fit-for-purpose for obvious reasons that have little to do with reductio
ad absurdum, or purely conditional arguments. Analysing idealisations in
terms of the status of propositions involved—suppositional vs. assertoric—
also seems much too dichotomous and coarse-grained to capture relevant
differences in the various kinds of idealisations and how they contribute to
predictive success. (See e.g. McMullin (1985) for useful distinctions amongst
different flavours of ‘Galilean’ idealisations, and Batterman (2005) for the
distinction between these and ‘non-Galilean’ idealisations.) Furthermore,
with respect to the articulation-of-realism challenge most importantly, it is
wholly unclear why a realist account of a model’s predictive success should
in any way depend on whether or not the ‘falsehoods’ involved are inten-
tional, as in the case of idealisations, or simply mistaken assertions about
the target. In both cases we can consider the relationship between the
target-as-represented-by-the-model, and the target-as-it-actually-is, in try-
ing to account for the model’s empirical success in terms of how it latches
6Schematically:
(P1) Suppose P .
(P2) From P derive Q.
————
(C) Conclude that if P then Q.
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onto reality.7
Idealisations in the semantic view. According to the semantic view of
theories idealisations are more of a piece with other approximations. The
semantic view is touted as providing a unified account of science where
models occupy a centre stage. Consider da Costa and French (2003), for
example, who offer models in the sense of (quasi-formal) model-theory as
an appropriate backbone to a ‘unitary approach to models and scientific
reasoning.’ In particular, their model-theoretic meta-scientific framework is
motivated as offering the wherewithal to capture idealisations and approx-
imations in science by providing ‘a more sophisticated concept of ‘model’
[. . . ] which accommodates the essential incompleteness and partial nature
of scientific representations.’ (p. 5) In their ‘partial structures’ formalisation
of the semantic view, idealisations (as well as other approximations) can
be ‘accommodated through the introduction of ‘partial isomorphism’ as the
fundamental relationship—horizontally and vertically—between theoretical
and data models.’ (p. 102) Furthermore, the model-theoretic framework fur-
nishes a notion of ‘quasi-truth’ that ‘can be used to formally underpin the
claim that idealisations are regarded as if they were true.’ (p. 163) (See da
Costa and French (2003) for details.) Moreover, arguably the considerable
flexibility of the partial structures framework allows it to also accommod-
ate non-Galilean infinite idealisations (Bueno and French, 2011). It is thus
offered as a truly unitary approach to understanding the role and workings
of idealisations—both Galilean and non-Galilean alike.
Is it enough for a realist to point to this meta-scientific framework as
providing a satisfactory response to the challenges that idealisations pose
to her? I do not think so. The framework of partial structures, partial
homo-/isomorphisms, and quasi-truth allows us to identify a formal corres-
pondence between an idealised model and its target, which in turn allows
us to formally (re)present the idea that the model is in a sense ‘latching
onto’ the target. Since idealised models can latch onto their targets in this
sense, the framework thus ‘accommodates’ idealisations. But we should try
to go beyond this by accounting for an idealised model’s empirical success
by showing how a model’s ‘latching onto’ unobservable reality can be con-
sidered to be responsible for the model’s predictive success. It is not clear
how the existence of partial homo-/isomorphisms between (a formal rep-
resentation of) a model and its target, or the model’s quasi-truth for that
matter, provides understanding of why the model is empirically successful by
virtue of latching onto reality thus-and-so, and regardless of incorporating
such-and-such aspects of misrepresentation. We should want a clearer sense
of the role played by the idealising ‘falsehoods’ in an idealised model, and
7The realist faces the epistemic challenge of justifying her knowledge of the target-as-
it-actually-is, of course, but this issue has nothing to do with idealisation per se.
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a clearer sense of how the realist can bracket those aspects of the model as
falling outside her realist commitments, despite them being useful, or even
indispensable for making the predictions. The existence of partial homo-
/isomorphism between an idealised model and a data model, for instance,
says nothing about this in and of itself, and little has been said by way of
analysing the explanatory credentials of such structural relations (vis-à-vis
the idealisation challenge) in the context of the semantic view.8
* * *
Many have taken to heart the notion, well expressed by Giere, that
when it comes to science ‘idealisation and approximation are the essence,
[so] an adequate theory of science must reflect this fact in its most basic
concepts.’ (Giere, 1988, p. 78) But in the face of the idealisation challenge
‘reflecting’ is not enough. An adequate (realist) theory of science should also
account for the empirical success of idealised models, and the above accounts
of idealisations fall short of throwing sufficient light on the roles played by
idealisations in the production of predictive success. In particular, we should
demand a clearer sense of how the realist can consider idealisations not to
be the driving force behind models’ predictive success, and how the realist
can rather consider the models’ latching onto reality to be responsible for
it.
4 Towards a realist analysis of idealisations
Scientific models and their inexact representational fit to the world raise
various questions, many of which specifically concern idealisations. But it is
important to realise that the articulation-of-realism challenge, in particular,
is actually not specifically about idealisations. Rather, it is an instance of
a much broader challenge to realism. The general form of the question at
stake is: how can a model that is false in this way be empirically successful
in that way? This question arises in connection with any empirically suc-
cessful model that incorporates falsehoods, regardless of the reason behind
those falsehoods. A model can incorporate falsehoods due to being idealised,
but also for other reasons. In particular, the same question arises even if
scientists are simply mistaken or misguided about their target of theorising.
Recognising the general nature of the question at stake, it is immediately
unclear why the realist response to it should vary depending on the reason
behind the representational inaccuracy in play. Why would it matter for the
realist response whether the reason behind a representational inaccuracy is
8It is possible that more can be said on behalf of the structuralist analysis of ideal-
isation, and the partial structures analysis of idealisations can well be a useful part of a
bigger picture, of course.
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an intentional simplification (as in the case of idealisation), or an uninten-
tional, erroneous assumption?9 After all, in both cases the realist hopes to
be able to answer this question in terms of how the model relates to its tar-
get, in such a way that we can regard the sense in which the model latches
onto its the target as being responsible for the model’s empirical success.
Furthermore, if we have a fruitful conceptual framework for offering a real-
ist response in connection with unintentional misrepresentations in science,
it is reasonable to try to apply that framework also to idealisations (qua
intentional misrepresentations).
My analysis of idealisations from a realist perspective is guided by this
line of thought. That is, I adopt a conceptual framework that I have found
fruitful and apposite in connection with some models that incorporate fun-
damentally misguided assumptions.10 I claim that within this framework
we can in quite general terms naturally account for idealisations’ utility in
modal terms, going beyond merely noting that idealisations traffic in non-
actual possibilia to which actual systems can be usefully compared, or that
there are different (quasi-formalisable) senses in which idealised models can
be ‘partially true’ despite the ‘falsehoods’ they incorporate.
Here is an outline of the conceptual framework. We shall focus on pre-
dictive success of models, ignoring their explanatory success for now. (I will
comment on the explanatory utility of idealisations later.) Given a partic-
ular model, I am interested in question Q: how is the model predictively
successful—viz. empirically adequate in the relevant ways—despite misrep-
resenting its target in certain respects. To answer this question we can
consider a range of models that vary in those respects, corresponding to a
range of possible systems they can be taken to represent. The aim is to show
how the required degree of empirical adequacy is independent of the partic-
ular false assumptions incorporated in the model. Independence is a matter
of robustness of predictive success under variation in possible modelling as-
sumptions that together with fixed background assumptions (including the
relevant laws) yield the predictive success at stake.
The thought is that modal information of this sort can furnish a realist
response to Q to the following extent: it shows how modelling assump-
tions can be false but nevertheless ‘contain’ veridical assumptions about the
target that are responsible for the predictive success in the sense that vari-
ation in the specific false assumptions, without variation in the ‘contained’
veridical assumptions, would not undo the predictive success. It is via these
9There are questions about the modelling practice that specifically involve idealisations:
for example, is the endemic and carefree employment of idealisations in tension with
realism? My way of framing the idealisation-challenge focuses on models themselves, not
the modelling practice.
10Some of these models have animated much discussion in the realism debate, such as
Fresnel’s elastic ether model of the partial refraction and reflection of light, used to derive
the so-called Fresnel’s equations. See Saatsi (2005).
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‘contained’ veridical assumptions that the model can be viewed as latching
onto reality so as to ensure the model’s predictive success. The specific
false assumptions involved, regardless of their indispensability or otherwise
for presenting and working with the model, are not doing any of the heavy
lifting in producing the predictive successes at stake.
The tricky business lies in spelling out the sense in which a set of model-
ling assumptions can ‘contain’ veridical, success-fuelling assumptions. (The
complex literature on verisimilitude and approximate/partial truth demon-
strates how difficult these issues are.) Here I take ‘containing’ to be a matter
of the specific modelling assumptions together with the relevant background
assumptions entailing some further, less specific features of the target sys-
tem, such that getting these further features right (in conjunction with the
relevant background assumptions, including laws) would suffice for a model
to exhibit the predictive success at stake.11 All this is perhaps best elab-
orated by illustrating it via a simple toy example. Before we get to this, I
note again that nothing in the abstract outline above directly corresponds
to the notion of idealisation. This is as it should be, for the reasons given
at the start of this section.
As for a toy example, consider a model system with a graph-like struc-
ture. The model represents its target system as having four nodes, connected
by some dyadic relations as in Figure 1.
Figure 1: 3-regular model with four vertices.
That is, the model represents a target of four vertices, connected with one
another in this 3-regular way. (A graph structure is 3-regular if each of the
nodes is connected to three other nodes.) Assume that the relevant back-
ground assumptions, including the relevant laws, allow one to make a suc-
cessful prediction about the system’s behaviour under some circumstances
(e.g. in the chemistry of carbon molecules.)
Assume further (for the sake of the argument) that the phenomenon in
question, given the laws, is only exhibited by systems that have less than
eight nodes, and that for such systems the phenomenon only depends on
3-regularity. That is, we are assuming that the relevant laws are such that
11By ‘entailing’ I mean not only logical entailment, but also metaphysical entailment,
such as the relationship between determinate and corresponding determinable properties.
If facts about such relationships can be packed into the background assumptions we can
ensure logical entailment, of course.
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even if the system were to have six nodes, say, and a 3-regular structure, it
would display the behavior predicted.
Given these assumptions, representing correctly the number of nodes is
clearly not relevant for the predictive success of our model. If as a matter
of fact the target is 3-regular and has six nodes (as in Figure 2), then the
model misrepresents the target regarding the number of nodes and relations
between them, but it still ‘gets right’ the fact that each of the nodes is
connected to three other nodes, i.e. the structure is 3-regular.
Figure 2: The actual 3-regular target with six vertices.
I take it that there is an intuitively clear sense in which our model gets
the relevant feature of the target right: it latches onto reality by correctly
representing the target’s 3-regularity. This is the critical, less specific feature
of the system that the model ‘contains’. It is less specific than the modelling
assumptions that specify which node is connected to which. (Note that 3-
regularity need not be part of the stated modelling assumptions, and need
only be ‘contained’ in these assumptions in the sense of being entailed by
them.) And it can be this sense of ‘containing’ of the veridical assumption
about the target—this sense of ‘latching onto’ the target—that explains
the model’s empirical adequacy vis-à-vis the phenomenon in question. The
model’s predictive success is explained in a way that renders wholly im-
material the misrepresentations the model incorporates with respect to the
number of nodes, and which node is connected to which. In the setting of
this toy-example, grasping this sense ‘latching onto’ the target adequately
answers the challenge at stake.
For the very same reason a model that represents the target as a different
3-regular graph of six nodes (as in Figure 3) would be equally empirically
successful. It also ‘gets right’ the fact that the target is 3-regular, and that
it has less than eight nodes. As it happens, there are only three 3-regular
graphs of less than eight nodes. A given target system can only instantiate
one of these specific structures, but given the laws (we have assumed), the
relevant features that our model needs to latch onto are less specific than
that. The critical, less-specific features of the target are: the target has 4 or
6 nodes; the target is 3-regular. These less-specific modelling assumptions
are realized in three different, more specific ways. Any model is going to in-
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corporate one or another of the specific realisers, but all that really matters
is that a model incorporates one or another of these features, i.e. that it
incorporates the less specific feature. Some models can furthermore count
as being idealised by virtue of incorporating such specific realiser that suf-
ficiently simplifies the model in its presentation and operation. (In some
context a 3-regular graph of mere 4 nodes could be an idealisation of a
larger 3-regular graph, for example.)
Figure 3: The other possible 3-connected model with six vertices.
This is merely a simple toy example, of course, but it serves to bring out
the key features of an interesting conceptual framework. In particular, it
shows how accounting for a model’s predictive success can turn on grasping
the robustness of predictive success under variation in the specific modelling
assumptions that all ‘contain’ a critical veridical assumption.12 The sense
in which a model (in relation to the relevant background assumptions) can
thus latch onto reality is conceptually quite straightforward, and not in my
view well captured by the existing (quasi-)formal frameworks for ‘partial
truth’, approximate truth, or verisimilitude. What matters is the grasping
of what is common to different possible systems, such that the common
feature is all that matters, since variation in other features is immaterial:
any model that features some ‘realiser’ of the common feature would count
as predictively successful. A derivation of the prediction further requires the
right laws of nature as background assumptions, grounding the relevance of
these less-specific features.
The sense in which modelling assumptions can ‘contain’ a veridical,
success-fuelling assumption need not be captured by a notion of partial truth
applied to propositions that can be used to specify the model. Consider, for
example, the model:
{Alice knows Bob. Bob knows Erik and Fred. Erik knows David
and Charlie. David knows Fred and Alice. Fred knows Charlie.
Charlie knows Alice.}
12This has connotations of robustness analysis of idealised models. (See e.g. Odenbaugh,
2011) Exploring the connections to the literature on robustness analysis requires further
work. (Thanks to Arnon Levy for flagging this question for me.)
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This model can latch onto the target represented by
{Alice knows Bob. Bob knows Erik and Charlie. Erik knows
David and Fred. David knows Alice and Fred. Fred knows
Charlie. Charlie knows Alice.}
The two systems represented by these two sets of propositions exhibit the
two alternative 3-regular structures with six nodes. Neither set of propos-
itions explicitly says anything about the shared 3-regularity, however, and
the underlying similarity is not explicitly represented by the propositions,
nor revealed by looking at the (partial) truth or otherwise of the (sets of)
propositions involved in presenting the two systems. Since the pertinent
similarity between the model and the target need not be part of the explicit
representational content of the model—the model need not represent the
target as 3-regular—I call the model inferentially veridical (as opposed to
representationally veridical). The idea is that from the model we can infer,
with the help of the relevant background assumptions, the critical veridical
assumptions.13
One may worry that this kind of ‘inferential veridicality’ is too thin to
support a realist account of empirical success. One may worry, for example,
how the less specific feature ‘having 4 or 6 nodes’—a disjunctive property—
can be attributed to the target. Or one may worry about the sense in which
a model ‘containing’ a veridical assumption of this kind can account for the
model’s empirical adequacy in a realist spirit. I think the right response to
such worries is to note that it is the appeal to laws of nature in deriving
predictions from a model that underwrites the significance of the less-specific
properties, regardless of whether or not they have disjunctive realisations.
So, given these laws, from a scientific point of view such a property can be
a genuine, bona fide feature of the world on which our theorising can latch,
despite its disjunctive (or unspecific, or vague) character. One way to put
this is to say that with the less-specific, veridical assumptions we are latching
onto an important modal truth: had the target had only 4 (as opposed to
6) nodes, all with 3 connections, the same result would have ensued given
the relevant laws of nature.
One may push the same worry in more general terms, in relation to
my characterisation of how the veridical assumptions are ‘contained’ in the
model. I said above that ‘containing’ is a matter of the specific modelling
assumptions together with the relevant background assumptions entailing
some further, less specific features of the target system. The worry here is
that this idea that the model is thus latching onto some less specific, more
abstract worldly features seems to face a ‘disjunction problem’: since any
13The realist can then claim that derivations of successful predictions involve such infer-
ences, and thus involve the veridical assumptions. Cf. Saatsi (2005) for related discussion
in connection with Fresnel’s model of light.
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modelling assumption p always entails p∨q, any model is (allegedly) guaran-
teed to latch onto reality, as long as there is some true q such that it would
work to produce the right prediction.14 Does a model’s inferential veridic-
ality thereby become a trivial matter, deflating realism of any worthwhile
commitment?
The answer is no. It is not the case that any model is guaranteed to latch
onto reality just by virtue of being predictively successful, since a model
latches onto reality partly by virtue of appealing to appropriate facts about
laws of nature. For example, if one constructs an empirically adequate model
M in classical Newtonian physics of a purely quantum phenomenon, the false
modelling assumptions are not latching onto reality, since there is no possible
classical model that provides a faithful, veridical representation of the target.
It is not the case that some more complicated classical model faithfully
represents the system and shares the critical, less specific properties with
M such that any classical model that exhibits those properties would be
equally empirically adequate as M . For the same reason a Ptolemaic model
with epicycles does not latch onto its target (the solar system) despite its
impressive empirical success.
Admittedly there is much more to be said regarding the kind of realism
that can be served by the conceptual framework I am proposing here, and I
hasten to add that it is not the case that realist intuitions and cause are saved
just by showing predictively successful models being inferentially veridical.
There can be interesting cases of local underdetermination where radically
different modelling assumptions, in conjunction with the right laws, give rise
to more or less the same predictions. (See for example Saatsi and Vickers
(2011) for one such case.) In such cases the explanation of predictive success
can have a strong anti-realist flavour. But in many cases the details of the
derivation, and in particular the role played therein by the relevant less-
specific features (with respect to which the model is inferentially veridical),
can serve the realist cause by saving the ‘no miracles’ intuition. Or so I
contend.
5 Beyond toy examples
I have proposed, largely in the abstract, a conceptual framework for ac-
counting for the predictive success of idealised models in modal terms. One
may wonder whether this conceptual framework can capture some real ideal-
ised models as well. I certainly think so! Consider a paradigmatic Galilean
idealisation, such as an ideal pendulum as a model of my grand father’s
pendulum clock. The model’s degree of empirical adequacy is naturally ac-
counted for in terms of the model’s inferential veridicality, in conjunction
14See Strevens’s (2008) discussion of the disjunction problem in connection with his
difference-making account of causal explanation that operates by abstraction.
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with the appropriateness of the background laws (Newtonian mechanics +
gravity). The model is inferentially veridical by virtue of entailing truths
about less specific features of the target such that any model that real-
ises those features in one way or another will attain at least that degree
of empirical adequacy. The relevant less specific features concern a vague
force function, vague specification of the pendulum’s dimensions, etc. The
ideal pendulum model represents a particularly simple specific realisation
of these less specific (vague) features, and its empirical adequacy is easily
accountable—regardless of its misrepresentation in these respects—by not-
ing the robustness of its predictive success under variation in the particular
false specification of the critical less specific features, the specification that
constitute the idealisation.
Various other Galilean idealisations similarly lend themselves to analysis
in these modal terms. (See Saatsi (2011) for further discussion.) One might
wonder how much we gain from this, given that arguably Galilean idealisa-
tions do not present a serious challenge to realism to begin with. Although
I already admitted (§2) that realists have a wealth of resources in respond-
ing to a challenge posed by Galilean idealisations, I think the realist can
further gain from the conceptual framework advocated here. In particular,
the framework allows us to shed further light on the modal aspects of ideal-
ised models, and how those aspects can feed into an account of an idealised
model’s empirical success. This framework affords us a better sense of a
particular way in which an idealised model can latch onto reality so as to
account for the model’s empirical success.
Furthermore, there are reasons to think that the framework can also deal
with (at least some) non-Galilean idealisations. The distinction between
Galilean and non-Galilean idealisations need not be as deep as one might
think. In relation to the much discussed infinite continuum idealisations in
statistical physics, for example, we may construe the distinction in terms
of how indispensable a given idealisation is to a model. On one side we
have Galilean idealisations which are controllable, at least in principle, in
the sense that we can we can replace our original model with a related, less
idealised model that represents the system in question more truthfully (for
example by including previously omitted forces). On the other side we have
uncontrollable, non-Galilean idealisations that cannot be thus eliminated or
reduced, even in principle, by a related, less idealised model. A paradigmatic
example of such uncontrollable idealisation is the use of the thermodynamic
limit in statistical physics of finite systems, where the number of particles
n and the volume V of a system are taken to infinity while keeping n/V
constant. This mathematical idealisation is uncontrollable since it cannot
be replaced with a model that takes n to be some finite-but-large number
(e.g. ∼ 1023), thereby representing better the finitude and atomicity of the
actual system.
The sense of indispensability of such uncontrollable idealisations raises
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interesting questions, and it clearly in some sense demarcates these ideal-
isations from the controllable cases. The uncontrollability in and of itself
does not mean that these models cannot be viewed as inferentially veridical,
however. What it means, rather, is that we are unable to construct models
that are more veridical in these idealising respects, so as to demonstrate in
that way how the predictive success of the idealised model is robust under
variation in the idealising assumptions. Models incorporating uncontrol-
lable idealisations can still be inferentially veridical, however, in the sense
that it can be a modal fact about the relevant laws of nature that they de-
ductively yield, when combined with more veridical assumptions about the
idealised features, the same or improved degree of empirical adequacy. Our
(in)ability to demonstrate this—in principle or in practice—by de-idealising
the original model need not necessarily be taken to indicate that such fact
does not obtain.
There is a close analogy here with debates concerning mathematics’ in-
dispensability to science. Nominalists argue that regardless of our inab-
ility to nominalize our best theories we can maintain that it is the non-
mathematical content of our theories that is responsible for the theories’
empirical success, with mathematics playing a role only in representing non-
mathematical facts and facilitating reasoning about it.15 In a similar spirit
I maintain that the indispensability of the uncontrollable infinite limits in
statistical mechanics, for instance, can be indispensable only for representing
and reasoning about systems with enormous but nevertheless finite numbers
of components. It can still be a modal fact about the relevant micro-level
laws of nature that they entail the same empirical results from veridical
assumptions about the interacting micro-constituents.
But how, one may wonder, can this attitude be justified, if not by having
good reasons to think that a model is de-idealisable, at least in principle?
The answer is that one’s understanding of the workings of an uncontrollable
idealisation can involve much else besides the assumptions that go into a
particular non-Galilean model. That is, the full set of theoretical resources
that can come to bear on justifying one’s belief in such modal fact about
the laws—justifying the inferential veridicality of the idealised model—goes
well beyond the modelling assumptions. In the full theoretical context of
such models we can arguably explain, by reference to relevant facts about
finite systems, why an infinite mathematical idealisation is empirically ad-
equate to the degree it is, notwithstanding its indispensability. This broader
theoretical contexts has been extensively discussed in the recent literature.
(See e.g. Butterfield, 2011a,b; Menon and Callender, 2013; Norton, 2012) It
is through such theoretical accounts of a given uncontrollable idealisation
that we get a handle on the sense in which the model ‘gets right’ some crit-
ical less specific features of large-enough systems. These are the features
15See e,g. Melia (2000) and Saatsi (forthcoming).
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that the model shares with large finite systems, features that in conjunction
with the relevant laws entail the right predictions (to a sufficient degree of
approximation).
The details of these ‘reductionist accounts’ of the continuum limit in
statistical physics remain to be discussed further in the context of my con-
ceptual framework. I have to leave this for further work, and move on to
conclude the paper with brief remarks on explanation. Throughout the
paper I have focused on the predictive success of idealised models, largely
bracketing the role of idealisations in successful scientific explanations. The
explanatory dimension also matters to the realist, of course, given the role
of inference to the best explanation in many realist gambits, for example.
(It is worth noting that Batterman’s much discussed work on uncontrollable
idealisations almost exclusively concern their explanatory indispensability.)
It is impossible for me to do justice to this rather large topic here, but let me
just note the importance of considering models’ explanatory successes quite
separately from their predictive successes. The distinction between predict-
ive and explanatory success was perhaps only of minor consequence back in
the day of the DN-model of explanation. But in the contemporary context,
largely ruled by different modal accounts of explanation, the conceptual dif-
ference between prediction and explanation matters a great deal to the way
realists should apportion their epistemological commitments in relation to
scientifically successful theories and models. Different issues come to the fore
in accounting for the explanatory role played by the falsehoods that consti-
tute idealisations. The indispensability of idealisations for explanations, for
example, raises issues for the realist that are closely related, or analogous to
the issues raised by the arguably indispensable role that mathematics plays
in scientific explanations. I have argued elsewhere that the realist should
consider the latter issues in close contact with well-formed views about the
nature explanation (Saatsi, forthcoming). I believe the same holds for the
former issues as well.
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